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THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 3, Number 15 (October 21, 1998) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENT 
President meets security commanders 
Russian Television (NTV, 1500 GMT, 8 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-281) broadcast 
footage from a Kremlin meeting between Yel'tsin and commanding officers from 
the military and security services. The apparent purpose of the meeting was 
twofold: to make assurances to the officers concerning the payment of back 
wages and to reassert presidential authority over the forces. According to an 
Interfax report (1949 GMT, 8 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-281), Yel'tsin reminded the 
commanders that the security organs "have traditionally been subordinated to the 
president and will always remain so." 
 
The timing of the meeting is interesting as it followed upon the heels of the day of 
planned mass protests. While participation in the demonstrations fell far below 
projected estimates, it is somewhat disconcerting to find that the president felt 
the need to remind his law enforcement officials just who is their chief 
commanding officer. 
 
Health issues resurface 
In the wake of his truncated visit to Central Asia, President Yel'tsin's health has 
once again become subject to close scrutiny and concern. Perhaps most notable 
this time around in the presidential health watch is the determined effort by 
Yel'tsin and his staff to show him, not in seclusion and resting, but defying 
doctors' orders and working in the Kremlin. (See, for example, NTV, 1000 GMT, 
14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
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Despite assurances from the Kremlin staff and cabinet members, questions 
about Yel'tsin's fitness to serve out the duration of his term are sure to continue 
for the foreseeable future, or at least until the next Duma elections. 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Primakov to supervise security services? 
The efforts to form a government in the wake of August's devaluation and 
Chernomyrdin's failed nomination have resulted in a remarkable number of 
incorrect and speculative reports on the composition and duties of the new 
government. With this caveat in mind, I pass along a report from ITAR-TASS 
(World Service, 0720 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-280) that Prime Minister 
Primakov distributed a list of duties and responsibilities of the prime minister and 
the deputies. Among Primakov's duties are the coordination of "matters related to 
military reform." He is also tasked with "ensuring the coordination of the work" of 
the MVD, FIS, FSB, Federal Border Guards, Ministry of Defense, the Federal 
Bodyguard Service and FAPSI. While the report noted that these were 
organizations that work "under the leadership of the president," several have 
been specifically subordinated to the president and administered by the 
presidential administration in the past. 
 
Perhaps it was Primakov and not the mass protests that sparked Yel'tsin's review 
of his commanding officers? 
 
FSB 
Restructuring not to require major staff cuts 
FSB Director Vladimir Putin, who has thus far retained his job despite persistent 
rumors of his dismissal, has announced that the presidential decree aimed at 
optimizing FSB performance will not result in substantial personnel reductions. 
"Insignificant cuts will be made among the support staff alone," Putin claims. 
(Interfax, 1353 GMT, 9 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-283) 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Sarah Miller 
 
Russia denies alliance with Cyprus...but guarantees S-300 contract 
Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir Rakhmanin described as 
groundless, and virtually "provocative," the reports about the Russian defense 
minister allegedly sending to his Cyprus counterpart a letter proposing to institute 
"Russia's military alliance with the Republic of Cyprus."(ITAR-TASS, 1030 GMT, 
6 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-279) Despite the defense ministry's denial of any military 
alliance with Cyprus following a meeting with Cypriot Defense Minister Ioannis 
Omirou on 6 October, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev guaranteed the 
delivery of the S-300 missile system and the fulfillment of related contracts. 
When Sergeev was asked specifically about the repeated Turkish threats to 
prevent, by force if necessary, the delivery of the S-300 system to Cyprus, he 
highlighted the "premature" nature of any response but stated that Russia was 
"closely watching the situation, studying the negative newness it is acquiring, and 
elaborating corresponding measures." (ITAR-TASS, 1030 GMT, 6 Oct 98; FBIS-
TAC-98-279) 
 
Given the fact that Turkish authorities have repeatedly threatened to use force in 
order to prevent the delivery of the S-300s to Cyprus, Igor Sergeev's guarantee 
would form the basis of at least a short-term military alliance that would cover the 
term of the S-300s' delivery and related contracts. 
 
Russia plays 'positive role' in international arena 
Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov stressed Russia's positive role in a multipolar 
world following a meeting with Yasir 'Arafat on 8 October. As NATO threats of 
airstrikes against Kosovo were still very real, Primakov used the briefing to 
highlight the positive, productive role his country is playing in the world 
community despite the difficult times which Russia is facing. He stated that 
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Russia is "continuing to play an active role on the international arena." He told 
journalists that "Our (Russia's) role is positive, we do not confront anyone, and 
our role is aimed at reaching stability, resolving conflicts by peaceful means and 
establishing a just peace in various regions of the planet." (ITAR-TASS World 
Service, 1311 GMT, 8 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-281) 
 
Maintains close relations with rogue states 
Primakov's comments came on the heels of a Libyan-Russian Cooperation 
Committee meeting as well as Sudanese praise for Russian-Sudanese 
cooperation. During the second session of the Libyan-Russia joint committee 
convened in Tripoli on 7 October, the Russian delegation pointed out the need to 
boost cooperation in all fields between the two countries. The Russian delegation 
also delivered a message from President Boris Yel'tsin to Libyan leader 
Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, "expressing a number of considerations about the 
situation concerning Libya and prospects for bilateral relations." (ITAR-TASS, 
0651 GMT, 9 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282, and Libyan Television Network, 1930 
GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-NES-98-280) Just two days prior to the Libyan-Russian 
contacts, the Sudanese ambassador to Russia, Izz ad-Din Hamid, hailed the 
continuing support being extended by Russia to Sudan. In an interview with the 
Russian daily Pravda, Hamid pointed out that the cooperation between Sudan 
and Russia began to increase in the past years, highlighting Russian economic 
assistance and the exchange of parliamentary delegations. (SUNA, 1845 GMT, 5 
Oct 98; FBIS-AFR-98-280) 
 
Mercenaries ready for Kosovo 
Vladimir Litvienko, captain of the Kuban Cossack host, told Komsomol'skaya 
pravda of the imminent formation of a battalion of Cossack volunteers prepared 
to go to Yugoslavia at once, if required. And they would be making a selfless 
gesture, following their hearts, and not doing it for money, which the Serbs do not 
have anyway. "They are not the greenhorns that were dispatched to Chechnya," 
Vladimir Petrovich said, "They are all men -- military professionals with combat 
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experience in Abkhazia and the Dniester Region, and many of them have been 
to Yugoslavia before, during the Bosnian war." Every day, reportedly, Cossacks 
in various villages and Krasnodar itself call the captain, asking to be sent to help 
the Serbs. There are several thousand of them now. All that is needed now, 
according to Litvienko, is for the relevant bodies not to place any obstacles in the 
way of enthusiasts wishing to help out their Slav brothers. Ideally these agencies 
should help organize the volunteers' dispatch to Kosovo. "After all, that was the 
case during the first volunteer recruitment," the captain explained, although he 
did not specify which "relevant bodies" he meant. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 
Oct 98, p. 2; FBIS-SOV-98-286) 
 
Belligerent to bizarre, Moscow 'threatens' NATO 
From a Cossack call to arms to a change in the security balance in Europe, the 
threat of NATO airstrikes against Serbian forces in Kosovo has evoked an 
endless stream of threats and rhetoric from Moscow. Colonel General Leonid 
Ivashov, head of the Russian defense ministry's main directorate for international 
military cooperation, told journalists on 13 October that a NATO-led military 
action in the Balkans would create a new military and strategic situation in 
Europe. General Ivashov indicated that a NATO strike against Serbian forces 
could result in a negation of the arms embargo against Serbia, and in what 
Ivashov referred to as "full scale military cooperation." (ITAR-TASS, 10 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-283, and ITAR-TASS World Service, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-
286). Although several organizations in Russia indicated that they were willing to 
send Slav mercenaries to Serbia, nullifying the existing arms embargo is the 
most credible and perhaps most serious threat to Balkan security emanating from 
Moscow. It appeared as though every member of the Duma had his/her own 
version of a threat against the West last week but few if any had a bite to 
accompany their bark. The predominant themes were a Duma delay, still further, 
of START-II ratification and dissolution of the NATO-Russia treaty. Although 
these threats may sound some alarms, they were primarily voiced for local 
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consumption and would serve only to damage Russian security interests in the 
Balkans and Europe. 
 
A Balkan Iraq-Kosovo victory for Russia 
Drawing a direct parallel to the Russian role in averting US-led military action 
against Iraq earlier this year, Primakov took credit for "easing the situation in 
Kosovo." Proclaiming Russian victory in an address to the Federation Council on 
14 October, Primakov stated, "you simply (need to) look at how Russia's position 
is reckoned with in the world. This was the case during the Iraqi crisis, and this is 
the case now in Kosovo." Primakov stressed the role that the countless "threats" 
directed against NATO from Moscow played in the resolution of the Balkan crisis 
when he stated that "we openly declared that our attitude to NATO and our 
orientation would be considerably changed if Yugoslavia was attacked. And this 
was the crucial argument which played its role. Obviously, there will be no strike." 
(ITAR-TASS World Service, 0715 GMT, 14 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Ivanov downplays NATO, stresses role of OSCE 
During a press briefing on 13 October, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, 
stressing one of the main themes of his predecessor Yevgeni Primakov, 
emphasized the role that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) would play in securing peace in Kosovo. While avoiding any talk 
of NATO, Ivanov said that OSCE observers would be verifying the safety and 
security of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. He also noted that the OSCE role in 
Kosovo was a Russian proposal; "the idea of sending this mission came from 
Russia." (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1631 GMT, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-286)  
 
Although the situation in Kosovo is far from resolved, the fact that NATO 
airstrikes have been avoided, for now, plays out as a Russian diplomatic 
success. This success, coupled with the enhanced role of the OSCE in Balkan 
security, serves to further the Russian position that the OSCE should play the 
lead role in security in Europe and NATO should be subordinate to the OSCE. 
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Preparations continue for Russian-Japanese summit 
With the Yel'tsin-Obuchi summit quickly approaching, Russia and Japan have 
discussed the text of a Russian-Japanese agreement on peace, friendship and 
cooperation. Discussion of the territorial issue, which is slated for the November 
summit, was omitted. (ITAR-TASS, 1348 GMT, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-286) 
Although Yel'tsin has promised to address the Japanese proposal on the Kurile 
Islands at the summit, domestic pressure may be enough to dissuade parliament 
from approving a territorial concession. In preparation for the summit, Japanese 
Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura spent three days in Moscow, meeting with 
Foreign Minister Ivanov, Prime Minister Primakov and President Yel'tsin. Japan 
has put an emphasis on the conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000, to which the 
territorial issue is linked. (Kyodo, 0247 GMT, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-EAS-98-285) 
Discussions have been complicated, but not thwarted, by a dispute regarding 
North Korean fishing rights in the waters off of the islands. The Japanese have 
suggested the DPRK received official Russian permission to do so and have 
asked that Russia withdraw that permission immediately. (Kyodo, 1152 GMT, 12 
Oct 98; FBIS-EAS-98-283) For the Russian's part, bilateral economic cooperation 
continues to top the agenda in lieu of real progress on the territorial issue. 
 
Six-way talks gain clear Russian support 
As expected, Russia continues to support the Japanese initiative regarding the 
Korean Peninsula. The Japanese recently suggested six-way talks including the 
ROK, DPRK, China, Japan, the US and Russia. Russia is in a singularly strong 
position as a result of its good relations with the DPRK and ROK. In recent 
weeks, the Russian government has consistently expressed willingness to take 
part in any level of talks concerning security on the peninsula. (ITAR-TASS, 1344 
GMT, 8 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282) 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Primakov discusses center-regional relations 
On NTV's "Big Money" program, Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov suggested 
changes in the way the center and the regions relate to each other. In return for 
greater power for the governors both in Moscow and at home, the regions would 
ensure greater financial transparency. It was not immediately clear how this 
would be accomplished. Primakov also suggested that the regions might be able 
to boost their finances by gaining access to state holdings in local companies. 
Such a move would further the process of political and economic 
decentralization, but it might also open up new portions of the economy to graft 
by local power bosses. 
 
Recognizing that the Russian economy cannot function without continued 
commercial interchange, Primakov also signed a government decree approving 
proposals by the finance ministry, agriculture and food ministry, commercial 
Agroprombank and investment Alfa Bank, to allow some portion of the debts 
owed by the regions to the center to be paid by deliveries of food and other raw 
materials. The decree stipulates that regional debts on 1997 loans from a special 
agriculture credit fund can be partially paid with grain, meat, sugar, vegetable oil 
and dairy product deliveries to the government's food bank. (ITAR-TASS, 0923 
GMT, 3 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-276) 
 
The regions and center continue to scramble to effect some measure of relief for 
the citizens of the new Russia. And though the thought of creating a barter 
economy might seem to be a giant step backward in Russia's progression to a 
modern, capitalist society, it might be preferable to a massive issuance of new 
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rubles and the roaring inflation this implies. In general, barter payments are 
denominated, as necessary, in pre-devaluation ruble rates, and until the ruble 
stabilizes, in-kind commercial exchange will continue. (NTV, 0435 GMT, 30 Sep 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-273) 
 
Boris Nemtsov tells why he was fired, discusses future 
In a lengthy interview, Nemtsov explains why he was sacked. Apparently his anti-
corruption campaign began to pinch the interests of the "oligarchs" who in turn 
pinched Yel'tsin and other decision-makers. Nemtsov admits three mistakes: he 
underestimated the power of the powerful, and he did not foresee the depth of 
the resistance in the bureaucracy to reforms. They resented interference in their 
individual fiefdoms. For example, there was much grousing when Nemtsov 
required bureaucrats to drive domestic automobiles. Finally, Nemtsov admits that 
a "more serious blunder" was his inability to explain to the citizens what he was 
doing. (Obshchaya gazeta, 1-7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Nemtsov's admissions seem to support those who predicted that the idealistic ex-
governor of Nizhny Novgorod would find it difficult to effect real change in 
Moscow given the Byzantine nature of its politics. However, it should be 
underscored that Nemtsov ultimately failed because the president ceased to 
back him, as he makes clear in this interview. This also suggests that Nemtsov 
relied too much on Yel'tsin's largesse and was unable, or did not see it as 
necessary, to construct a broad enough power base to withstand the inevitable 
onslaught of those who were at the unpleasant end of his reforms and who also 
had the president's ear. 
 
Nemtsov is also standing for election to the Duma sometime in the near future, 
and he is constructing a center-right political bloc. Yel'tsin recently appointed him 
to the unpaid position of deputy chairman of the Council for Local Government. 
His duties are to liaise with other regions. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 2220 
GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-274) 
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7 October draws fewer protestors than predicted 
Russia's Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that, as of 10:30 a.m. Moscow time, 
some 62,000 people were taking part in protests in eastern Russia and Siberia 
rather than the 225,000 predicted. The low turnout happened across the country 
as many people took advantage of the day as an unexpected but welcome 
holiday from work. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0835 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-280) 
 
The seeming lack of popular interest in the nationwide demonstration can be 
understood, among other things, to be a response to a lack of faith in the 
government to fix the mess it created. 
 
Nizhny Novgorod finally elects a mayor 
Yuri Lebedev has won the mayoral election in Nizhny Novgorod. Lebedev 
received more than 44 percent of the votes versus the 41 percent returned to his 
rival, the lawyer Dmitri Bednyakov. A total of 12.5 percent voted against both 
candidates. 
 
The new mayor, age 47, was born in Nizhny Novgorod, worked as a history 
teacher, headed the Shakhunya District administration, and served as deputy 
governor and acting governor of Nizhny Novgorod Region. For about a year, until 
April 1998, he was President Yel'tsin's representative in the Nizhny Novgorod 
Region. He was removed from the post as a sign of presidential displeasure in 
response to the fiasco of the mayoral election on 29 March 1998. That election 
was won by Andrei Klimentev, but the result was declared invalid. (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 2143 GMT, 11 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-284) [ISCIP Note: for further 
information on the history of the saga surrounding the mayorship in Nizhny 
Novgorod, see "Jailed Nizhny Novgorod mayor registered for city election," 
Editorial Digest - Domestic Issues and Legislative Branch, Vol. 3, No. 12, 2 
September 1998.] 
 11 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma is considering the third charge against Yel'tsin 
The commission, set up by the Communist-dominated lower house of parliament, 
has produced two charges against Yel'tsin--the signing of the Belovezhie 
agreements which dissolved the Soviet Union, and the use of force against the 
Supreme Soviet (parliament) in October 1993. 
 
A third charge being debated accuses the president of starting the war in 
Chechnya in late 1994. "We have not yet reached a draft conclusion," 
commission chairman Vadim Filimonov said, adding its members differ on how to 
assess Yel'tsin's actions. "All commission members agree that the president 
committed an abuse of power, but as for a homicide charge, this issue was not 
backed," Filimonov said. (ITAR-TASS, 1055 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-285) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Michael Reardon and Charles Drummond 
 
Russia's CFE inspection report card--two A's 
The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in Paris in 1990 
and subsequently amended at Russia's request, subjects the total number of 
personnel of land-based and air forces on the continent, armaments and military 
equipment to reduction. The treaty's basic goal is to achieve a safe and stable 
balance of conventional armed forces in Europe. In early October, two 
multinational inspections were conducted to check armaments and military 
equipment information which the Russian side declared as of January 1998. 
These teams also checked how Russia is fulfilling its commitments under the 
CFE Treaty at these facilities. 
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From 29 September to 2 October, British military experts inspected a number of 
military facilities in the Moscow Military District, including air and motorized 
infantry units near Tver. (ITAR-TASS, 1525 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-275) A 
week later, Dutch experts finalized an inspection of military sites in the Russian 
Leningrad region. The inspectors visited motorized infantry units stationed near 
Kamenka for two days. (ITAR-TASS, 1930 GMT, 9 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-283) 
Both inspections revealed no violations of the CFE Treaty. Of course, it is 
interesting that the results of these inspections were relayed to the press by an 
official from the Russian defense ministry -- not from the British or Dutch 
inspectors. On the slim chance conflicting results arise in the coming weeks, a 
follow-up will be carried in the next Editorial Digest. 
 
The boxes should have been marked 'Contents not Authorized for Resale'  
On 12 October, customs officials stopped a railroad train loaded with ammunition 
and weapons in the city of Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan. Officially listed as 
humanitarian aid, the cargo had originated in Iran, was headed for Tajikistan and 
from there was due for delivery by truck convoys to northeastern Afghanistan. 
That Afghan area is controlled by warlord Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, who fights 
against the Taliban. The train's 16 cars were found to be chock-full of essential 
humanitarian items such as Grad missiles, artillery shells, machine gun 
ammunition, antitank and land mines, infantry grenades and other humanitarian 
combat items, some of them Russian-made. Four other cars of the same train 
are unaccounted for--probably the ones carrying bread and milk. Kyrgyzstan's 
State Security Ministry, which took over the investigation from the Customs 
Inspectorate, seems to be keeping the affair under wraps. 
 
It is an interesting coincidence that the story broke on the day when Russian 
President Boris Yel'tsin was in Tashkent to conclude a military cooperation 
agreement with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. That tripartite alliance is directed 
against "Islamic extremism," and the Taliban is one target. (Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 15 Oct 98) Russian officials should be safe denying 
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involvement in the sale of arms to Afghanistan this time, and I'm sure they were 
as surprised as I was to hear that any Russian-made humanitarian items were 
emanating from Iran. Where could they have come from? 
 
Arms industry hopes that the sum of the 'parts' is greater than the whole 
In this period of declining sales of new arms systems, Russian arms exporters 
appear increasingly willing to broker more innovative arrangements to remain 
competitive. This "keep your foot in the door" mentality for a licensing agreement 
would make even Willie Loman proud, as preparations have been completed for 
the licensed production of Su-27SK fighters in China. Under this agreement, 
Chinese engineers will assemble the first planes at the Shenyang aircraft-
building plant from parts supplied by the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft-Building 
Society (the chief Russian producer of Su-27SK fighters). As is customary in the 
world licensing practice, the first Su-27SK planes will be assembled with the help 
of Russian specialists from ready-made parts, assemblies, and systems. 
According to the issued license, China plans to build up to 200 Su-27SK fighters. 
Parts for three planes have been delivered to Shenyang already this year. (ITAR-
TASS, 1306 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-275) 
 
The Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant has provided the Chinese with the necessary 
blueprints and equipment for assembling Su-27SK planes. According to some 
reports, the total cost of the provided technologies is estimated at $150 million. 
The Russian plant is to deliver later approximately 30 percent of all the 
completing parts for the 200 Chinese Su-27SK planes. The most significant part 
of the contract is that the Russian side will also deliver AL-31F aircraft engines 
and radio-electronic equipment sets for all the assembled Su-27SK planes. This 
becomes the de facto enforcer of the export ban portion of the contract. 
 
The contract should be very profitable for the Russian aircraft-building industry. 
Its implementation will guarantee orders to the Russians for many years to come. 
At the same time, the contract specifically stipulates that any modifications in the 
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Su-27SK fighter made in Shenyang can be effected only with the consent of the 
Russian side. This condition will remain in force not only during the serial 
production of Su-27SK planes in China, but also during the entire period of their 
use in the Chinese Air Force. (ITAR-TASS, 1306 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
275) 
 
Deals such as this may be exactly what the Russian arms export industry needs -
- especially with a customer such as China. It is doubtful China will have the 
technological capability to produce quality weapons systems and platforms in the 
foreseeable future and Russia should continue to court this business partner to 
the maximum extent possible. Considering the depressed state of the Russian 
economy and the minimal sales over the past four or five years, long-term deals 
such as this may be the only way these Russian salesmen can avoid ending up 
like Willie Loman. 
 
What's a '0' between friends -- or foes? 
The Khasan Customs House post (located at the junction of three state borders: 
China, North Korea, and Russia) intercepted five MI-8 military helicopters during 
an attempt to smuggle them to North Korea. The helicopters were heading to the 
border from Khabarovsk Krai. During inspection, the helicopters were found to 
contain "Friend or Foe" identification equipment. It turned out that the 
accompanying documents lacked the signature of the chairman of the Russian 
Army General Staff Committee for Military Policy and the stamp of the Moscow 
Board of Trade through which the Arden firm had concluded the deal. The 
presence on board the helicopters of the "Friend or Foe" identification equipment, 
which is a military secret, is such a serious incident that Prime Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov was immediately notified about it. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-282) Lucky for the Russian Federation they have such brilliant custom 
officers! It was reported that the customs officers' suspicion was aroused by the 
low price stated in the declaration -- just $20,000 -- whereas their market price is 
about $300,000 apiece. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282) I guess 
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that means if the unsigned, official documents carried a price of $300,000 on the 
"smuggled helicopters" line, the customs officers would have let them pass. 
Hopefully, smugglers won't check their "Smuggler's Price Book" before 
attempting to transport those nuclear-tipped, Topol-Ms. 
 
Warning: Don't 'make' all your warheads in one basket 
At a news conference on 6 October, First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov 
called for, among other things, construction of 35-45 new Topol-M missiles every 
year starting in 2000 and several new submarines for the Navy. Maslyukov said 
that these systems are necessary because existing weaponry is aging and will 
start to be deactivated within two or three years. (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Oct 98) 
Earlier reports stated the annual Topol-M production rate would be a bit less, 31, 
starting in 2000. (Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 17 Sep 98) Even the lesser 
figure represents a significant portion of a meager defense budget. According to 
RFE/RL, military analyst Pavel Felgengauer critiqued Maslyukov's proposals as 
unrealistic. His argument was based on the premise that nuclear deterrence 
could be assured for Russia with much fewer warheads than the 35-40 being 
proposed annually. He added that the "Russian military-industrial complex can 
survive only as a small, separate, narrowly specialized sector. If [Russia] 
attempts to continue the Soviet tradition of combining the development and 
production of TV sets and teleguidance for aviation bombs at the same firm, then 
televisions will spontaneously explode as they used to and half the bombs will 
miss their target." (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Oct 98) 
 
It is difficult to analyze the Russian defense budget and determine exactly where 
all the funds are (or are not) going. However, it is pretty safe to say that there 
aren't enough funds to cover all the training, maintenance, construction and 
equipping necessary to maintain the Russian military in a high state of readiness. 
It is also safe to say that if a higher percentage of the available funds are 
earmarked for Topol-M missiles, then there will be even fewer funds available for 
readiness programs and, without some other change, this will spell disaster. 
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Though his number may need to be increased by an order of magnitude or two, I 
would have to agree with Felgengauer's prospect for the future when he said, 
"...if all of Russia's resources are used on nuclear deterrent forces, then 
conventional forces will suffer and Russia will be vulnerable to attack by a 
thousand well-trained guerrillas." (RFE/RL Newsline, 8 Oct 98) 
 
A missile and a flame thrower for all my friends 
Although the Russian economy is self-destructing, workers are still not receiving 
regular wages, and the Russian military is in the midst of downsizing, the push is 
on to sell newly developed and recently upgraded weapons systems. What may 
be the driving force behind the spate of weapons systems announcements, that 
indeed read more like advertisements? In short, hard, cold cash. During the last 
several weeks the Russians revealed two surface-to-air missile system 
upgrades, a new surface-to-surface missile, efforts to sell fighter aircraft to 
Australia, five attack helicopters en route to Bosnia-Herzegovina, a new flame 
thrower, and finally, the advantages of owning an S-300 system over the US 
Patriot missile. Each of these items is worth a quick analysis. 
 
ITAR-TASS reported on 30 September on the new Buk-M1-2 air defense system. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1041 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-273) The press release touts 
the Buk-M1-2 as an "air defence missile complex" that can home in on land and 
water surface targets in addition to aircraft and cruise missiles. This "new" 
system is a development of the Buk-M1 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, 
known in the west as the SA-11 "Gadfly." So, on first glance, it appears that the 
new variant is a significant upgrade to the standard SA-11. This is probably not 
true. In typical Russian fashion, an existing system has been incrementally 
modified to expand its capabilities. Reports from an air show at which this system 
was being promoted reveal that the primary difference between the two versions 
is a modified telar (teleporter-launcher). The telar, a tracked vehicle that serves 
as the missile carrier/launch platform, now incorporates a laser rangefinder, 
allowing ground targeting. The real purpose of the press report is in essence a 
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sales pitch, directed towards the "Asian-Pacific region and Latin America." The 
article, quoting from Military Parade magazine, took aim at a potential western 
competitor, the Evrosam, which is supposedly years away from having the 
capabilities that the Buk-M1-2 already has. In other words: Buy our system, 
please. 
 
Information on an improvement to another SAM system was published by ITAR-
TASS in the beginning of October. (ITAR-TASS, 1034 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-275) This system is the Fakel Machine-Building and Design Bureau's S-
300PMU-2 Favorit air defense system (NATO reporting name: SA-10E). Just 
prior to the recent Greek "Defendory '98" arms exhibition, the Fakel company's 
chief designer was the subject of an interview in Moscow. Vladimir Svetlov 
detailed his company's achievement in producing new, smaller, and more 
accurate missiles for the S-300PMU. This upgrade is noteworthy from a military 
standpoint -- the smaller size allows an S-300 unit to transport and launch 16 of 
the new missiles, versus 4 of the older, larger missiles. Fakel and the Russian 
government are hoping that the missile upgrades will make the S-300PMU 
system even more attractive in the world arms market, where it is competing 
against the US Patriot system. 
 
At the 10-day "Defendory '98" arms show, Russian defense minister Igor 
Sergeev was on hand to promote the S-300PMU. Sergeev was "sure" that the 
Russian system was much better than the Patriot, and assured potential buyers 
that the S-300 was compatible with NATO weapons systems. (ITAR-TASS, 1352 
GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-280) The Russians in particular were trying to 
convince Greece to buy the S-300 instead of the American system. Perhaps 
trying to butter up the Greeks in the hope that they would sign on the dotted line, 
Sergeev was noted to have remarked that the S-300s were in "great demand, so 
Russia only sells them only to its close partners." That short list (based on S-300 
sales) currently includes Ukraine, Belarus, China, Bulgaria, and the Czech 
Republic. Greek Cypriots are, of course, scheduled to join that club, but their S-
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300s have yet to arrive. A cynic might note that probably all it takes to become a 
"close partner" is the purchase of an S-300 system. Greece went with the Patriot 
but did agree to buy a shorter-range SAM system from the Russians. 
 
A new surface-to surface missile for the popular Grad multiple rocket launcher 
was announced in early October. (ITAR-TASS, 1220 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-280) There are about 3,000 Grad launchers deployed in over 50 countries, so 
the potential market for a new, more accurate weapon is quite large. The 
targeted customers are Middle East and Southeast Asian countries. A marketing 
program has been started by Splav, manufacturer of the missile, supported by 
the Russian government's arms export company Rosvooruzhenie. 
 
Rosvooruzhenie's efforts in arms exports are far-ranging; recently company 
representatives visited Australia to acquaint that country's air force with the MiG-
29 and Su-27 fighter aircraft. This was part of a larger overall effort to show what 
Russia could provide in upgrading Australia's air defense systems. (ITAR-TASS, 
1221 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-275) The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) 
currently is equipped with US F-111 tactical bombers and F/A-18 Hornet strike-
fighter aircraft. The F-111s have been envisioned to last until the 2010 time 
frame or beyond, as are the Hornets. While the RAAF is looking at the Russian 
planes, it seems unlikely that these particular Russian aircraft would be used to 
replace American aircraft. Although the Su-27 is an impressive airframe, capable 
of multi-mission employment (i.e., air-to-air and air-to ground capabilities), both it 
and the MiG 29 have been around for quite some time. In fact, the MiG-29 and 
F/A-18 are of comparable vintage. It would make more sense, money permitting, 
for the RAAF to look at obtaining the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, now under test 
flight for the US Navy. 
 
The Russians did have some recent success in selling aviation platforms, albeit 
on a small scale. Five of the ubiquitous MiG-24 "Hind" attack helicopters were 
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sold to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (Sarajevo Oslobodjenje, 6 Oct 98; 
FBIS-EEU-98-279) That's not a large purchase, but hey, a sale's a sale. 
 
From missiles, to aircraft, to helicopters, to flamethrowers: Russia would like to 
be your arms dealer. Described as a "jet-driven infantry flamethrower" with a 
range of up to 1,000 meters, the Shmel (bumblebee) is now for sale. The press 
report remarks that it has a "strong demoralizing effect," and we might heartily 
agree. The Russians state that they can offer this unmatched combat gear at a 
price "beyond compare"; perhaps even more favorable rates can be obtained if 
buyers show up with dollars in hand. (ITAR-TASS, 0943 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-275) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
United on Kosovo 
Across the CIS, member states are adopting a united stance on Kosovo. Member 
states, led by Ukraine and Belarus, have voiced support for a diplomatic solution 
to the problems in Kosovo and have opposed the use of force against 
Yugoslavia. This stance essentially echoes Russia's, which has been opposed to 
NATO-led air strikes against Yugoslavia. (Tanjung, 1358 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-285) 
 
The CIS responds to the southern threat 
At a recent bilateral meeting, Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Boris Yel'tsin 
agreed that the Afghan situation presents a direct and serious threat to the 
southern borders of the CIS. As a result, the presidents pledged to "closely 
interact on bilateral and multilateral levels and actively participate in the U.N. 
efforts aiming to move the Afghan armed conflict into the vein of peaceful political 
decisions acceptable to all Afghans." The two further pledged to pursue the issue 
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within the CIS. (ITAR-TASS, 0818 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-285) This 
came just days after the commander of CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Tajikistan, 
Nikolai Pugachev, stressed that the threat from Afghanistan's Taliban shouldn't 
be dismissed since they will hardly "abandon the idea of aggression, with 
Tajikistan as their next target." (Radio Rossii, 0900 GMT, 10 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-
98-283) CIS peacekeepers in Tajikistan and the Russian Federal Security 
Service (FSB) have devoted a significant portion of their time to controlling drug 
trafficking and the stream of political asylum seekers attempting to enter 
Tajikistan. (ITAR-TASS, 1319 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-275) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
A dash of bribery and a pinch of threats save the cabinet ... for now 
The cabinet of ministers, led by Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko, survived a 
no- confidence vote by the Communist-dominated Supreme Council on 13 
October. The measure, which needed 226 votes in favor to pass, fell 23 votes 
short. (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 Oct 98) A vote of no confidence would have forced 
the resignation of Pustovoytenko, but would not have affected President Leonid 
Kuchma, who is elected by popular vote. 
 
The measure was backed by the Communist, Socialist and Hromada parties, 
which seemed to have the upper hand in the power struggle until shortly before 
the vote. The tide began shifting, however, when Pustovoytenko and Kuchma 
signaled their willingness to sacrifice "certain" unnamed ministers, and suggested 
that cabinet posts would be offered to parties who supported the government. 
Kuchma then announced that he would name Communist Party leader Pyotr 
Symonenko prime minister if the council voted out the current government. 
(Interfax, 1655 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-285) The possible cabinet posts 
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and the not-so-appealing prospect of a parliament controlled by the Communist 
Party were apparently enough to bring together a coalition of seven parties in 
support of the current government. Interestingly, the coalition included the 
Peasant Party, which is led by Supreme Council Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko, 
and which is ideologically aligned with the Communists on many issues. 
 
The reward is coming, however. One day later, on 14 October, Kuchma 
announced that he soon would reshuffle the government, and is in the process of 
consulting with "various parliamentary groups to find professionals." The 
president also said he is increasing his efforts to facilitate the formation of a 
coalition that will represent a parliamentary majority. (Interfax, 1233 GMT, 14 Oct 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-287) 
 
Meanwhile, Symonenko, whom Kuchma threatened to name prime minister, said 
Communists are ready to "shoulder all the responsibility" of the government. 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 16 Oct 98) Unfortunately, they're not invited ... this year. 
 
Comment 
The possibility that Kuchma can bring together a coalition as a check against the 
three leftist parties is doubtful, but the chances that Pustovoytenko would survive 
this no-confidence vote were also slim. Just one month ago, most members of 
parliament reportedly believed that the government would fall. In fact, Oleksandr 
Turchinov, leader of the Hromada Party, told reporters on 16 September that he 
had a commitment to support the no-confidence motion from 230 MPs. (IT-TASS, 
0930 GMT, 16 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-259) Both Kuchma and Pustovoytenko 
have so far shown themselves able to straddle delicately the gap between the 
necessary economic reforms championed by the West, and the pressures of a 
left-leaning, reactionary parliament. The situation is, however, similar in many 
ways to that found in Russia at the height of President Boris Yel'tsin's power, with 
one or two men standing in the way of a return to Soviet-style policy. For now, 
Supreme Council Speaker Tkachenko seems to understand that presenting at 
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least the appearance of a united government is of utmost importance in the 
current crisis. The parliament, however, remains on the verge of devolving into a 
mirror image of the Russian Duma.  
 
Debate over the fiscal year 1999 budget will begin in earnest during the next 
month. Kuchma has proposed an austere budget supported by the IMF, while the 
parliament has asked him to reduce the cuts found in the budget. When the 
debate is over, it should be much clearer in which direction the parliament will 
lead Ukraine. 
 
All for one and one for all 
The four GUAM countries -- Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova -- are 
increasing their lobbying efforts for development of a "multi-option pipeline 
system to ship Caspian fuel." The countries released a joint statement on 6 
October after a meeting at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington. The meeting 
included the Ukrainian, Moldovan, and Georgian prime ministers, as well as a 
senior presidential advisor from Azerbaijan. All were in Washington for the 
annual meeting of the World Bank. The statement outlined several major goals of 
the organization, including the pipeline, development of a "Eurasian transport 
corridor," and efforts to deal with "growing challenges and threats to global and 
regional stability and security." (Interfax, 1059 GMT, 6 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
279) During the World Bank meeting, US Energy Secretary William Richardson 
announced his support for the Caspian oil pipeline, which would transport oil from 
Azerbaijan, through Georgia, Ukraine and Poland to Western markets. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 7 Oct 98) The leaders did not comment, 
however, on recent reports that, in preparation for the pipeline, the GUAM 
countries have agreed to establish a joint battalion of peacekeepers to be 
deployed as needed in the Abkhazia and Karabakh regions. (For background, 
see Ukrayina Moloda, 17 Sep 98, p. 5; FBIS- SOV-98-278) 
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I couldn't afford to buy anything even if you paid me... 
Prime Minister Pustovoytenko said last week that the government has been 
unable to reduce the volume of unpaid salaries to state workers, and said the 
state budget now owes $935 million in back wages and social benefits. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 14 Oct 98) The country now has only $1 billion in currency reserves at 
the most. Meanwhile, the official inflation rate for the first nine months of the year 
was 6.1 percent, while the value of the hryvnya has fallen 79 percent during that 
same period. (Interfax, 0845 GMT, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-286) 
 
BELARUS 
Betrayed! 
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka lashed out this week at several countries of 
Central Europe for not uniting in support of "our Slavic brothers," the Serbians. 
Bulgaria and Rumania received the brunt of his wrath for "conspiracy to the 
crimes being prepared at the Balkans." He was "shocked," he said, shocked. 
"Our Slav unity is sacred. Suddenly, it is all betrayed, stomped out," he cried. He 
warned that his "attitude" toward these states "has morally changed." Belarus, he 
said, would "make pertinent conclusions with regard to ... relations with these 
countries." (Interfax, 1213 GMT, 13 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-286) Curiously, these 
statements had little effect on the policies of the Central European countries, 
which granted NATO permission to overfly their countries for airstrikes against 
Serbia. 
 
Meanwhile, Lukashenka offered "modern arms to combat both missiles and 
aircraft" to Serbia, and set up a headquarters to recruit "volunteers with various 
military qualifications, in order to provide military support for the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia." (Interfax, 1414 GMT, 9 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-282, and Belapan, 
1550 GMT, 9 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282) 
 
At least we still have each other 
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Just one month after Russian Prime Minister Primakov said, "We will do 
everything to ensure that the union becomes stronger" between Russia and 
Belarus (ITAR-TASS, 1137 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-273), the Russian 
Duma has ratified two military agreements that create a legal framework for 
cooperation between the military forces of the two countries. Most importantly, 
the treaty on "regional security" details the guidelines for "forming, controlling and 
training an armed forces group for ensuring the two countries' security." Belarus 
has already ratified these agreements. (Interfax, 1621 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-275, and ITAR-TASS World Service, 0804 GMT, 2 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-275) 
 
Drozdy, chapter 10 
As diplomats continue to stay away from Minsk after being forcibly evicted from 
the Drozdy diplomatic compound, President Lukashenka recently unveiled a new 
reason why the evictions were necessary. Lukashenka originally said that the 
compound needed renovations. Then he said he needed more room for his 
presidential property. Now, it seems that certain unnamed foreigners were 
planning to assassinate Lukashenka, and their base of operation was Drozdy. 
Lukashenka gave an interview on 6 October and ominously explained, "It is 
probably too early to talk about this, but the president's life hung by a thread, ... 
and that crime, unfortunately, had been prepared a few steps from where we are 
standing now." The correspondent reporting this story on the state-run BTK 
Television Network added "By the way, the site where Alyaksandr Lukashenka 
was answering this question is situated not far from the famous Drazdy.... It looks 
as though not everything is so simple in the Drazdy issue." Indeed. (BKT 
Television Network, 1800 GMT, 6 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282, and Jamestown 
Foundation Monitor, 7 Oct 98) 
 
MOLDOVA 
It's going to be a long, hard winter 
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The Moldovan government this week turned over a portion of its gas distribution 
system to the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom as partial payment for debts 
totaling over $600 million. At the same time, the government reportedly issued 
$90 million in state obligations to Gazprom, with a 7.5 percent annual interest 
rate. The actions came after Gazprom reduced service to Moldova by 50 percent 
and threatened to eliminate service completely by the end of November. 
 
The IMF, which has been holding back on extending loans to the country, has 
criticized the state obligations plan for its negative effect on the country's external 
debt. Meanwhile, Gazprom will reportedly receive a 51-percent share of the gas 
distribution system. Moldova will retain 35 percent, and the breakaway republic of 
Transdniestr, which is responsible for two-thirds of the entire Gazprom debt, will 
receive a 14-percent share. There was no explanation as to why Moldova was 
unable reach a deal with Gazprom similar to those reached by Belarus and 
Ukraine. Both countries agreed to repay their debts with goods and/or services. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 8 and 16 Oct 98) 
 
Comment 
With this agreement, Moldova has, in effect, placed a leash around its own neck. 
Gazprom, which is heavily tied into the Russian government, and Transdniestr, 
which wants to be heavily tied into the Russian government, now control the only 
gas distribution 
system in Moldova. The only question is, when and how will the leash be pulled? 
 
Speaking of Transdniestr ... 
The latest round of talks between Moldova and representatives of the Dniestr 
Region have been postponed indefinitely. It is unclear why the two sides were 
unable to meet. (ITAR-TASS, 0950 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-274) Moldova 
has announced, however, that it is pulling out one peacekeeping platoon (82 
men) from the Dniestr area. The troop removal is the first following the 20 March 
Odessa agreement, in which Moldova and Transdniestr agreed to reduce their 
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peacekeeping troops by 200 men each. The state-run press wrote, "The 
Moldovan side expressed hope the initiative would be followed by the Dniestr 
side."(Infotag, 1930 GMT, 12 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-285) There has been no 
comment from Dniestr, and it would appear that, given the strong current political 
position of the region, none will be quickly forthcoming. The Odessa agreement 
makes no provision for a reduction in Russian peacekeeping forces. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Archival Revelations 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Concerning the September-October 1993 coup attempt 
Dmitri Volkogonov's notes dated 31 August 93: 
A few days ago, on 24 August, I hosted a visit by members of the American 
delegation which was looking into the question of Americans who had 
disappeared in the Soviet Union. After the discussion, Colonel Par and another 
American diplomat asked to hold a short confidential meeting. 
 
When only the three of us remained, Par said, "US Ambassador Pickering asked 
that we confidentially relay information from a reliable source in Moscow, who 
informed us that in October the opposition will attempt a coup, possibly a 
parliamentary uprising to remove President Yel'tsin. We can neither confirm nor 
deny the veracity of this information. It is possible that people will be stirred up, 
the president will be charged with violating the constitution, and an 
announcement of his removal from power will follow. Possibly this will happen at 
the Congress. Intensive preparations are underway. Such is our information...." 
 
I thanked them and told Filatov and Ilyushin (two people close to the president) at 
the first opportunity. Later I told B.N. He reacted calmly, "That is to be expected." 
I think that is only one possible scenario of the revanche of the Communist 
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Thermidor.... (Volkogonov papers, Box 13, Reel 8, in the Manuscript Reading 
Room of the Library of Congress) 
 
Comment 
If the information the Americans supplied was indeed true, it suggests that the 
events of September/October were not the unfortunate results of personality and 
policy differences. Rather the opposition was involved in a conspiracy against the 
president and would use the differences over the constitution as a pretext to 
force him out of office. 
 
Concerning Georgian politics 
Dmitri Volkogonov's notes dated 5 October 1992: Aslan G. Abashidze asked to 
receive him in private. An hour-long meeting was held on 5 October. 
 
The main point: Abashidze does not conceal his pro-Russian leaning. "I do not 
conceal in Georgia that I am a Russophile." According to him, Shevardnadze 
does not make any decisions on his own. He is in the hands of Kitovani and other 
criminal elements. They need him to serve as cover. I want to ask Yel'tsin not to 
pull the army out of Ajaria. Russia must be firm in its dealings with Georgia; that 
way it will be valued higher. If a referendum on staying with Russia were held 
now -- although the suggestion is totally fantastical -- 90 percent would say yes. 
 
Russia must remove weaponry from Georgia (e.g., that which belongs to its 
armed forces). Instead, to influence, we should be more active in the use of 
personal contacts. 
 
On Chechnya: If Yel'tsin invites Dudaev to Moscow, he will come immediately. 
This will improve the situation in the Caucasus in general. 
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In sum he asked to see the president. "Russia should not abandon the 
Caucasus. Its place will immediately be filled by Turkey, Iran and other countries. 
Russia should leave, in order to remain...." 
 
M.D. Male, an adviser to the president on conversion, and I wrote a note to B.N. 
Yel'tsin asking him to receive Abashidze. (Volkogonov papers, Box 13, Reel 8, in 
the Manuscript Reading Room of the Library of Congress) 
 
Comment 
This note contains an apparent contradiction: The Russian military should stay in 
Ajaria but pull its weapons out of Georgia. It seems that Abashidze wants the 
Russian military presence to remain only in his region, where it can support him, 
and pull out of the rest of Georgia. Or perhaps he meant pulling weapons out 
would ensure that they would not fall into the wrong hands. 
 
The timing of the conversation is interesting since it takes place only a few 
months after the start of armed hostilities in Abkhazia. Yet they fail to mention 
Abkhazia explicitly in the conversation. Surely the question of Russia's continued 
presence has bearing upon that conflict. 
 
It seems that Yel'tsin was told several times before the start of the war that 
Dudaev needed a face-saving way of reaching a compromise with Russia. 
Dudaev tried on several occasions, through the mediation of Ingush President 
Ruslan Aushev, to achieve such a meeting, yet each time the advisors closest to 
Yel'tsin thwarted this possibility. [For more details on Dudaev's efforts to secure a 
meeting with Yel'tsin, see Carlotta Gall and Thomas deWall, Chechnya: Calamity 
in the Caucasus (New York and London: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 
76-102.] 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
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By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
January presidential elections sanctioned by parliament 
In spite of all his previous assertions to the contrary, President Nazarbaev will 
indeed stand in a presidential election one year before his term of office was 
officially expected to end. On 8 October, in a special joint session of both 
chambers of Kazakhstan's parliament, legislators passed a resolution calling for 
new presidential elections to be held in approximately three months, on 10 
January 1999. (Kazakh Radio First Program Network, 0700 GMT, 8 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-281) 
 
The Kazakh parliament's decision to hold early presidential elections is generally 
viewed as a response to President Nazarbaev's 30 September State of the 
Nation Address, in which he called for a number of reforms in electoral 
procedure, governmental power distribution, anti-corruption measures, press 
freedoms, and government support for women's civil rights. Among the most 
significant of his proposals for government reform were: the suggestion to add 
ten seats to the Majlis (the lower chamber of the Kazakh parliament), to be filled 
based on proportional representation; to abolish the requirement of a 50-percent 
turnout of eligible voters in order for election results to be deemed valid (a 
requirement which dates back to Soviet times); to abolish the 204,000 tenge 
(over US$2,500 ) fee which candidates in parliamentary elections are currently 
required to pay in order to obtain a place on the ballot (Agence France-Presse, 
1415 GMT, 30 Sep 98; nexis); to eliminate the president's role as chief of the 
Supreme Judicial Council (Kazakhstan's highest court); to create a commission 
for women's issues and to increase the number of women serving on all state 
bodies; to establish a ministry of state revenues to oversee tax collection and 
customs inspection; to reduce the size of government structures; to redefine 
government ministers' powers, as well as the degree of their accountability for 
the success or failure of their ministries' work; and to hold the prime minister 
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directly responsible for the ministers' rate of achievement. (Kazakh Television 
First Channel, 0317 GMT, 30 Sep 98; The British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 
Oct 98/nexis)  
 
The most surprising, and oddly enough, the most contentious, change that 
President Nazarbaev called for was his proposal to transfer a portion of his 
powers to the prime minister and to the parliament. He stated that the prime 
minister should be granted a certain amount of authority in the approval or 
discharge of government ministers (currently, only the president has this 
authority), and that parliament be given the right to draft constitutional 
amendments, provided that 80 percent of the deputies vote in favor of the 
proposed amendments. (Agence France-Presse, 1415 GMT, 30 Sep 98; nexis) 
Far from hailing the president's suggestions to enlarge their powers, however, 
parliamentary deputies rejected them and then issued their own demands to the 
president. In addition to calling for early presidential elections, MPs also 
proposed increasing the terms of office for the president (from five to seven 
years), for senators (from five to six years), and for Majlis deputies (from four to 
five years), as well as introducing a change in the minimum age requirement for 
presidential candidates (from 35 to 40 years of age). The parliament voted to 
abolish the maximum retirement age for the president, which had previously 
been set at 65. President Nazarbaev is presently 58; by 2006, when the next 
presidential term of office comes to an end, he will have turned 65. (Agence 
France-Presse, 1210 GMT, 8 Oct 98; nexis) 
 
Comment 
This rather odd tug-of-war between President Nazarbaev and the parliament is 
generally considered to be simply a tacit agreement to enlarge slightly each 
side's authority. In return for the power to propose constitutional amendments, 
parliament will permit the president to extend his term of office into the 21st 
century, by giving the opposition parties so little time to organize their own 
presidential campaigns that President Nazarbaev's reelection is virtually assured. 
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A number of the most prominent opposition members (e.g., Petr Svoik, Akezhan 
Qazhygeldin) have also been the subjects of vigorous smear campaigns by the 
government. The rest of the reforms called for by President Nazarbaev could be 
viewed as his first campaign promises, particularly his promises to ensure the 
supply of heat and electricity to Kazakh citizens, to subsidize partially Kazakh 
farmers by buying one million tons of grain from them at "fair" prices (current 
world prices are low) and to set aside 25 billion tenge of the state budget for 
paying wages, pensions, and creating new jobs. (Agence France-Presse, 1415 
GMT, 30 Sep 98; nexis) Whether the rest of his proposals turn out to be little 
more than window dressing to boost his credibility in the eyes of both his 
domestic and foreign critics remains to be seen. 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
Wheat shortage expected; government looks for international aid 
The Kyrgyz government appealed to international relief organizations to donate 
20,000-30,000 tons of wheat. Due to an overly cold spring, Kyrgyzstan's grain 
harvest is expected to be at least 60,000 tons short of last year's totals. A second 
reason for the anticipated wheat shortage is the fact that many farmers have 
apparently given up grain cultivation in order to produce fruits and vegetables 
instead. (Interfax, 0859 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-273) 
 
Large coal deposits found in the southeast 
Geologists from the city of Osh have now discovered two large coal deposits in 
Kyrgyzstan's southeastern districts, not far from the Uzbek border. Both deposits 
are located in the Turkiston-Alai Ridge where prospecting is being conducted at 
the request of the Kyzylkiya Komur joint-stock company and other, smaller 
businesses. The most recently discovered coal deposit in Chon-Alai District is 
approximately 9-20 meters below the earth's surface, and is 16-17 meters wide. 
(Vecherniy Bishkek, 10 Sep 98, p. 5; FBIS-SOV-98-275) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
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Foreign ministry refutes allegation of Taliban POWs on Tajik territory 
On 29 September, Tajikistan's foreign ministry issued a statement to the press in 
which it firmly denied a Pakistani newspaper's recent charge that approximately 
80 prisoners of war from the Taliban's forces are being held in Tajikistan. The 
Pakistani newspaper alleged that Northern Alliance General Ahmad Shah Mas'ud 
had moved a group of prisoners whom he had captured from the Taliban to the 
Tajik city of Kulob. Tajikistan's foreign ministry rejected this accusation as 
misinformation intended to portray the Tajik government as guilty of meddling in 
Afghanistan's internal affairs by supporting one of the groups involved in the 
current Afghan conflict. The foreign ministry statement also emphasized the Tajik 
government's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Afghan conflict and its oft-
repeated calls for the cessation of outside interference in Afghanistan's domestic 
affairs. (ITAR-TASS, 1650 GMT, 29 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-272) 
 
Police station bombed in center of Dushanbe 
At 11:25 a.m. local time on 1 October, a package carrying an explosive device 
was thrown out of a car window at the Dushanbe city police department, located 
in the center of town. According to investigative experts, a bomb containing the 
equivalent of 500-600 grams of TNT had earlier been placed underground, 
outside the police department building. No one was injured in the blast, but the 
building incurred a fair amount of damage. No information was available about 
the assailants' identities at the time of the report. (Interfax, 0749 GMT, 1 Oct 98, 
and ITAR-TASS, 0748 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-TOT-98-274)  
 
Government, UTO issue ultimatum to illegal armed groups 
On 1 October the Tajik government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) 
leadership released a joint statement in which they offered those UTO forces and 
independent militia groups who have so far refused to disarm one final 
opportunity to relinquish their weapons and cease their attacks against civilian 
populations. The members of these illegal armed groups were given one week in 
which to disarm. All those who complied with this deadline were provided security 
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guarantees and promised exemption from prosecution. Those who refused to 
meet this deadline would be subject to forcible disarmament in a joint 
government-UTO operation. Two militia leaders were singled out in the statement 
as being responsible for the majority of crimes: Saidmukhtor Yorov and Rawshan 
Ghafurov, who were both defined as renegades, unaffiliated with either the Tajik 
government or with the UTO. (Radio Tajikistan First Channel Network, 1200 
GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-274) 
 
In a later news conference on an Iranian radio program, UTO Chairman Said 
Abdullo Nuri provided a few additional details about militia leader Saidmukhtor 
Yorov. Mr. Nuri stated that Yorov's troops had agreed to serve under UTO 
Commander Umar earlier in the disarmament process, but had then refused to 
accompany Commander Umar to another camp. It was at this point that the UTO 
leadership expelled Yorov's men from its ranks. (Voice of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 1600 GMT, 6 Oct 98; FBIS-UMA-98-280) 
 
IMF, World Bank have reconfirmed their commitment to aid Tajikistan 
Tajikistan's presidential press service informed ITAR-TASS on 7 October that 
high-level representatives from both the IMF and the World Bank have reassured 
the Tajik government that they are fully committed to helping the country 
implement economic reforms. The Tajik government has launched a three-year 
economic development program, which the IMF and the World Bank have 
pledged to support with US$340 million. Tajikistan's National Bank has already 
received the first tranches of these funds. (ITAR-TASS, 1921 GMT, 7 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-280) 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
No success in debt negotiations with Ukraine 
Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Anatoli Golubchenko was in Ashgabat on 30 
September, to hand President Niazov the Ukrainian president's proposals for 
settling at least a part of Ukraine's $704 million gas debt. Due to the effects of 
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Russia's financial crisis, the Ukrainian economy is having difficulties with its 
balance of payments and currency reserves. Consequently, President Kuchma 
put forward a plan to repay part of his country's debt to Turkmenistan with 
commodities, at prices approved by the Turkmen government. The Turkmen 
government rejected this plan. Relations between the countries remain cordial 
enough, however, that the two sides are continuing to discuss collaborating in 
various bilateral projects, including the construction of a salt plant in western 
Turkmenistan (in the town of Gaurdak), the reconstruction of compressor 
stations, and building a bridge across the Amu Darya River in eastern 
Turkmenistan. (Interfax, 1537 GMT, 1 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-275) 
 
Protocol signed with Turkmen-Turkish gas pipeline project 
On 5 October Turkmenistan's Minister of State Energy Yolly Gurbanmuradov and 
Turkey's Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Cumhur Ersumer signed a 
protocol in Ankara on their countries' collaboration in a "Turkmen-Turkish-
European Natural Gas Pipeline via the Caspian Sea and the Selling of Turkmen 
Natural Gas to Turkey." The protocol details the steps to be taken in preparing 
the official agreement on this project, which was scheduled to be finalized on 20 
October in Ashgabat. (Anatolia, 1422 GMT, 5 Oct 98; FBIS-WEU-98-278) 
 
Amnesty granted to prisoners on 50th anniversary of Ashgabat earthquake 
In order to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the earthquake which 
destroyed much of Ashgabat, President Niazov decreed an amnesty on 6 
October, according to which approximately 8,000 prisoners who were being held 
while under investigation were to be released. The amnesty included 
approximately 800 women, 180 minors, World War II veterans, men over the age 
of 60, cancer and tuberculosis patients, anyone having received a suspended 
sentence, people with less than one year left to serve, people sentenced to ten 
years or less for an unpremeditated crime, and those who received sentences of 
five years or less for a premeditated crime. Prisoners who were convicted on 
murder, terrorism, high treason, abuse of power or on drug-related charges were 
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not affected by the amnesty, however. (Interfax, 1513 GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-280) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Same song, different singer 
The man who replaced Yevgeni Primakov as Russia's foreign minister 
demonstrated (as if there were any doubt) that Russia's foreign policy would not 
soften with Primakov's ascension to prime minister. In an address to the United 
Nations General Assembly on 22 September, Igor Ivanov warned that "Russia 
cannot and will not remain indifferent to the fate of hundreds of thousands of 
Russian-speaking citizens subjected to harsh repressive measures in Latvia and 
Estonia." (General Assembly, 53rd session, 9th plenary meeting, 22 September 
1998; Official records of the United Nations, A/53/PV.9) Alas, no concrete 
examples of repression sprang to Mr. Ivanov's mind. Indrek Tarand, of the 
Estonian foreign ministry, later reminded the assembly that the UN and the 
Council of Europe had both decided to end their monitoring programs in Estonia 
because there was no evidence of human rights violations. (Baltic News Service 
Daily Report, 1500 GMT, 26 Sep 98) 
 
Two weeks after his trip to New York, Ivanov repeated another of Primakov's 
favorite sentiments, concerning NATO expansion. "There is a red line which we 
regard as a cardinal change directly connected with our security," Ivanov told 
reporters for the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia. "This line goes along the 
border of the former Soviet Union, including the Baltic states." (Interfax, 1106 
GMT, 8 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-282) 
 
ESTONIA 
Goodbye, Mr. Ilves 
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After months of media speculation as to whether he would leave his post, and 
encouragement to do so by his political opponents, Estonian Foreign Minister 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves presented his resignation to Prime Minister Mart Siimann 
on 30 September. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1000 GMT, 30 Sep 98) 
"[F]oreign policy is less and less of a priority for many political forces, especially 
for the ones in government. ... For populist reasons, foreign policy decisions are 
not being made any more.... Looking at recent attacks by leading politicians in 
the government coalition on Estonia's foreign policy and the Estonian Foreign 
Ministry, I can only conclude this is happening only because of my party 
alignment," Ilves explained. (Radio Tallinn Network, 0900 GMT, 30 Sep 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-273) While he generally does not comment on ministerial 
shufflings, President Lennart Meri told reporters that he thought Ilves' resignation 
was the right step, given the impossibility of serving simultaneously in opposition, 
as party chairman, and in government, as minister. (Estonian Television Network, 
1800 GMT, 30 Sep 98; FBIS-SOV-98-273) 
 
LATVIA 
In-country voters show more flexibility that their counterparts abroad 
Apparently eligible voters living outside Latvia are less flexible about citizenship 
issues than their counterparts inside the country. According to preliminary 
reports, only one-sixth of the 30,000 eligible voters living abroad participated in 
the 3 October polling; however, a large majority (65 percent) of that 5,000 
rejected the proposed amendments to the citizenship law and supported the 
conservative and nationalist Union For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK (47 
percent) that had forced the referendum on the amendments. Clearly these 
voters did not serve as a reliable indicator for either the parliamentary elections 
or for the fate of the referendum, which did pass in the end. Continuing the trend 
of backing conservative parties, voters abroad also supported the People's Party 
(26 percent), while Latvia's Way garnered 11 percent. (Baltic News Service, 1551 
GMT, 7 Oct 98; FBIS-SOV-98-280). As reported in the previous Digest, 
preliminary results indicate that voters in Latvia were more broad-based in their 
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political support. In fact, no segment of the political spectrum received a clear 
mandate, and a coalition government appears to be the only viable solution. With 
proportional representation, the Saeima will be almost evenly divided. Right-
center groups received 42.48 percent of the votes (The People's Party, 20.93 
percent, For the Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK, 14.15 percent, and the left-of-
center New Party, 7.4 percent), while their opponents received 45.32 percent: 
Latvian Way Union garnered 18.22 percent, and will be accompanied by 
members of the People's Harmony Party (14.23 percent) and the Latvian Social 
Democratic Union (12.87 percent). (Radio Riga Network, 1100 GMT, 4 Oct 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-277) 
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